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PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS WITHOUT
A BILL OF RIGHTS
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERT FRENCH*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Unlike the United States, Australia does not have a Bill of
Rights in its Constitution, nor does it have a Charter of Rights in
statutory form. There is current debate about the desirability of a
Human Rights Act for Australia, which would require statute law
to be interpreted, where possible, consistently with the human
rights set out in the Act. In one version of the proposal, the
Human Rights Act would also require that where a statute was
found by a Court to be incompatible with a human right, the Court
would make a declaration of that incompatibility. Upon such a
declaration being made, the relevant Minister would be required
to inform Parliament of what he or she proposed, if anything, to do
in response to the declaration.
In writing this Article, I do not intend to take a position in the
current Australian debate. If a national Human Rights Act does
come to pass, it may be that its interpretation and even its validity
will be argued before the High Court. The object of this Article is
to say something about the present position in relation to the
protection of human rights in Australia by reference to the
Australian Constitution and the common law of Australia.
Whether greater protections are necessary and how they should be
provided if they are needed are policy questions to be resolved
ultimately in the national parliament.
It is helpful to begin by looking back to the debate about the
inclusion of rights guarantees when the representatives of the six
Australian colonies that became the states were drafting the
Constitution at the end of the nineteenth century.
II. HUmAN RIGHTS AND THE DRAFTING OF THE AUSTRALIAN
CONSTITUTION

Andrew Inglis Clark was a leading intellectual force among
the colonial delegates to the conventions that drafted the national
Constitution. He was the principal proponent for the inclusion of
rights guarantees in that Constitution. As Attorney-General for
* Chief Justice of Australia since Sept. 1, 2008. Previously a judge on
the Federal Court of Australia, 1986-2008.
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Tasmania, he was very familiar with the Constitution of the
United States and with key Supreme Court decisions relevant to
the Constitution. Clark was well aware of the Bill of Rights that
comprised the first ten and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution. He believed in the natural or rational rights
of man as a counter to what he called "the tyranny of the majority,
whose unrestricted rule is so often and so erroneously regarded as
the essence and distinctive principle of democracy."' After the
1890 Federation Convention in Melbourne, Clark prepared a
preliminary draft of an Australian Constitution, which drew
extensively from that of the United States. 2 It formed the basis for
much of what was to appear in the Constitution as finally adopted.
In his draft, Clark included four particular rights based on
American influences. They were: (1) the right to trial by jury, (2)
the right to the privileges and immunities of state citizenship, (3)
the right to equal protection under the law, and (4) the right to
freedom and non-establishment of religion.
Clark sought to expand the equal protection guarantee at the
1898 Convention.3 He proposed that a state not be able to "deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
its laws." 4 He justified the prohibition by quoting the words of a
leading American jurist, Justice Cooley of Michigan. He said,
A popular form of Government does not necessarily assure to the
people an exemption from tyrannical legislation. On the contrary,

the more popular the form, if there be no checks or guards, the
greater perhaps may be the danger that excitement and passion will
sway the public counsels, and arbitrary and unreasonable laws be

enacted.5

A great part of the debate in relation to Clark's rights
1. ANDREW INGLIS CLARK, STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 386 (Sydney
Publishing 1997) (1901).
2. A copy of Clark's draft is available at JOHN WILLIAMS, THE AUSTRALIAN
CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 63-112 (Melbourne University
Press 2005).

3. Clark did not attend the 1897-1898 Adelaide Convention and he sent
written amendments to the 1898 Melbourne Convention. See JA LA NAUZE,
THE MAKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 67, 93 (Melbourne University
Press 1972); H. REYNOLDS, 3 AUSTRALIAN DICTIONARY OF BIOGRAPHY: CLARK,
ANDREW INGLIS (1848-1907) 399-401 (Melbourne University Press 1969),
available at http://adbonline.anu.edu.aulbiogs/ A030378b.htm.
4. MERCURY, Aug. 19, 1897.The amendment also appears in "Proposed
Amendments to the Draft of a Bill to Constitute the Commonwealth of
Australia", Australian Archives Mitchell, Series R216, Item 310 at 4 and cited
in John M. Williams, With Eyes Open: Andrew Inglis Clark and Our
Republican Tradition,23(2) FED. L. REV. 149, 176 (1995).
5. Proposed amendments to the draft of a Bill to constitute the
Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Archives Mitchell, Series R216, Item
310 at 4-5. See also Williams, supra note 4, at 177.
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provisions took place at the 1898 Convention in Melbourne. There
was opposition to rights guarantees that would affect the
legislative powers of the states. This was particularly directed to
the equal protection and due process guarantees. The authors of a
recent text on bills of rights in Australian history have observed
that
[tihese proposals were attacked both on the basis that such
guarantees were unnecessary for the protection of the rights of
citizens in a polity based on representative and responsible
government, and because they were seen as having the potential to
restrict colonial laws that limited the employment of Asian
workers.6
A racial basis for opposition to these guarantees was apparent
from the remarks of the Premier of Western Australia John
Forrest who said,
It is of no use for us to shut our eyes to the fact that there is a great
feeling all over Australia against the introduction of coloured
persons. It goes without saying that we do not like to talk about it,
but still it is so. I do not want this clause to pass in a shape which
would undo what is about to be done in most of the colonies, and
what has already been done in Western Australia, in regard to that
class of persons.
At the time, and for a long time after federation, Western
Australian laws prohibited persons of Asiatic or African descent
from obtaining a miner's right and from mining on a goldfield.
The colony also had a racially biased Immigration Act.
The equal protection proposal was based on the U.S.
Fourteenth Amendment. Isaac Isaacs, one of the delegates who
later became Chief Justice of Australia and subsequently the first
Australian Governor-General, argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment had been inserted in the U.S. Constitution after the
Civil War because the southern states had refused to concede
rights of citizenship to persons of African descent. The object of the
amendment, as he characterised it, was to ensure that African
Americans would not be deprived of the right of suffrage and
various other rights of citizenship in the southern states. He did
not think it necessary to insert such a clause in the Australian

6. ANDREW BYRNES, HILARY CHARLESWORTH, AND GABRIELLE MCKINNON,
BILLS OF RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA: HISTORY, POLITICS AND LAW 25 (UNSW Press
2009) at 25; see also GEORGE WILLIAMS, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 37-42 (Oxford University Press 1999).
7. Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention,
666

(Melbourne

1898)

available at

http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/pubs/

records.htm (click on "Third Session, Melbourne, 22 January - 17 March
1898"); also cited in GEORGE WILLIAMS, THE CASE FOR AN AUSTRALIAN BILL
OF RIGHTS: FREEDOM IN THE WAR ON TERROR 21 (UNSW Press 2004).
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Constitution8
In the event limited rights provisions were adopted based on
those proposed by Clark, they comprised the right to trial by jury
in cases of offences against the Commonwealth tried by
indictment, 9 a prohibition on the Commonwealth establishing any
religion or preventing the free exercise of any religion,10 and the
protection of the residents of one state from discrimination by
another state on the basis of residence." The anti-discrimination
guarantee was the relic of Clark's equal protection proposal. It is
important, however, to acknowledge that these are not the only
sources of rights protection in the Commonwealth Constitution.
III. THE SHAPE OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION
The Australian Constitution has eight chapters that deal with
the following topics: Chapter I - The Parliament, Chapter II - The

Executive Government, Chapter III - The Judicature, Chapter IV
- Finance and Trade, Chapter V - The States, Chapter VI - New

States, Chapter VII - Miscellaneous, and Chapter VIII Alteration of the Constitution.
The law-making power of the Commonwealth is vested in the
Commonwealth Parliament, which consists of "the Queen, a
Senate, and a House of Representatives."1 2 Section 51 of the
Constitution sets out the subjects upon which the Parliament of
the Commonwealth is authorised to make laws. There are thirtynine heads of power in that section.
Chapter II of the Constitution deals with the Executive
Government. The key provision of that chapter is section 61 which
provides: "The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in
the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the
Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and
maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the
Commonwealth." By convention, the Governor-General acts upon
the advice of the Australian Ministers of the Crown through the
Federal Executive Council that is established under section 62 of
the Constitution. This section locates the effective executive power
in the Ministers of the Crown.
Chapter III of the Constitution deals with the federal
judicature. Each colony that became a state already had in place a
court system. Those court systems continued after federation and
8. Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention
available at http://www.aph.gov.aulsenate
1898)
(Melbourne
668
/pubs/records.htm (click on "Third Session, Melbourne, 22 January - 17 March
1898").
9. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution § 80.
10. Id. § 116.
11. Id. § 117.
12. Id. § 1.
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continue today. The judicial power of the Commonwealth is vested
in the High Court of Australia, such other federal courts as are
created by the Parliament, and such other courts (that is, courts of
the states) as are invested with federal jurisdiction. The High
Court is the final appellate court for all Australian jurisdictions.13
The Constitution took effect in a society operating upon
certain assumptions about the rule of law and basic freedoms
reflected in the common law inherited from England. The common
law that has over the years evolved and been modified, still
provides the setting in which the Commonwealth and state
constitutions and constitutional institutions operate and in which
statutes are interpreted. It is part of the Constitution of Australia
and of its states in a small "c" constitutional sense.
IV.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION

The absence of a bill of rights in the Australian Constitution
is, in part, a function of our history. The movement towards the
formation of an Australian federation, which began in the last
decade of the nineteenth century, came from the colonists. It was
driven by their concerns about foreign affairs, immigration,
defence, trade and commerce, and industrial relations. There was
some anxiety about the colonising activities of France and
Germany in the region and such concerns could not be dealt with
by a system of six separate colonial governments. The federation
movement did not seek to rid Australia of British hegemony as
there was no desire to assert against government generally, or the
British government in particular, rights and freedoms for
colonists. In fact, the rights most intensely debated were those of
the individual colonies as proposed states, vis a vis, the proposed
federal parliament.
The colonists saw themselves as essentially British. It has
been argued persuasively that a consciousness of white
nationalism was central to federation and the invocation of that
consciousness has been described as related to a "cultural strategy
in the processes of nation-building."1 4 It informed the inclusion in
the Constitution of a power for the Commonwealth Parliament to
make laws with respect to "[tihe people of any race, for whom it is
deemed necessary to make special laws."15 The purpose of that
provision, according to the constitutional commentators Quick and
Garran writing in 1901, was to authorise the Commonwealth
Parliament to localise the "people of any alien race"16 within
13. Id. § 71.
14.
HELEN IRVING, To CONSTITUTE A NATION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
AUSTRALIA'S CONSTITUTION 100 (Cambridge University Press 1997).

15. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution § 51(xxvi).
16. SIR JOHN QUICK AND SIR ROBERT GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED
CONSTITUTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 622 (Sydney, Angus &
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defined areas, to confine them to certain occupations, and to
restrict their immigration. It also extended to giving such people
special protection and securing their return to their country of
origin.17
The principal proponent of the power was Sir Samuel Griffith
who later became Australia's first Chief Justice. The main debate
was not whether there should be such a power, but whether it
should be exclusive to the Commonwealth or shared with the
states.
There was virtually no reference to the Aboriginal people of
Australia during the Convention debates on the race power.
Indeed, they were expressly excluded from the coverage of that
power so that the states could retain legislative power with respect
to them. It was not until 1967 that the Constitution was amended
to remove that exclusion so that the Commonwealth Parliament
would have the power to make laws for Aboriginal people, as well
as the people of any other race. The oddity is that the beneficial
amendment was grafted onto a provision originally conceived as
supporting adversely discriminatory laws.
Having regard to the history of the federation movement, it is
not surprising that the Constitution has little to say about the
relationship between government and the governed. Australian
legal academic, Professor George Williams, has suggested that
many of the drafters of the Constitution were influenced by the
nineteenth century English constitutional commentators, Bryce
and Dicey.18 Neither Bryce nor Dicey saw a need to expressly
guarantee rights in written constitutions. In her writing, Professor
Helen Irving has referred to colonial liberals and conservatives
among the drafters of the Constitution. The conservatives, for the
most part, were primarily concerned with states' rights. The
liberals, however, represented liberal utilitarianism associated
with the ideas of John Stuart Mill. Professor Irving wrote, "In the
area of human rights, the majority, including most conservatives,
took the Millsian approach, seeking the restriction of belief and
action only in so far as their free expression harmed others."19 The
tendency, as she described it, was to respect rights and freedoms
negatively from interference but not to declare them positively.
Sir Owen Dixon, a former Chief Justice of Australia, in
comparing the United States and Australian Constitutions,
attributed the omission of a bill of rights to a readiness on the part
Robinson 1901).
17. Id.
18. See WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 39. See also JAMES BRYCE, AMERICAN

COMMONWEALTH (Macmillan 3d ed. 1912) (1906); ALBERT VENN DICEY,
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (Macmillan,
10thed. 1959).
19. IRVING, supra note 14, at 168.
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of the framers of the Constitution to leave the protection of rights
to the legislature and the processes of responsible government. He
stated,
The framers of the Australian Constitution were not prepared to
place fetters upon legislative action, except and in so far as it might
be necessary for the purpose of distributing between the States and
the central government the full content of legislative power. The
history of their country had not taught them the need of provisions
directed to the control of the legislature itself.20
In holding that there was no basis in the Constitution for
implying general guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms,
another Chief Justice of Australia, Sir Anthony Mason, said in
1992,
To make such an implication would run counter to the prevailing
sentiment of the framers that there was no need to incorporate a
comprehensive Bill of Rights in order to protect the rights and
freedoms of citizens. That sentiment was one of the unexpressed
assumptions on which the Constitution was drafted. 21
It is sufficient to say that there was probably a variety of
reasons behind the absence in Australia's Constitution of a bill of
rights, some related to the desire to maintain the capacity to
discriminate against particular racial groups and others reflecting
a loftier vision of the nascent Australian constitutionalism.
Hypotheses more than 100 years after the event, however
plausible, are unlikely to yield a single reliable explanation.
There are a number of provisions in the Commonwealth
Constitution, including the survivors of the Clark proposals, which
answer to some degree the description of human rights
guarantees. Each of them may be dealt with briefly.
Section 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution authorises the
Commonwealth Parliament to make provision, among other
things, for medical and dental services, but is subject to the
limitation that it does not authorise any form of civil conscription.
This section was introduced into the Constitution in 1946 after the
High Court had struck down a law providing for the supply of
pharmaceutical benefits paid for by the Commonwealth. The
limitation on the constitutional power, which would exclude any
form of civil conscription, was proposed by Robert Menzies to avoid
the power being used to nationalise the medical and dental

20. Sir Owen Dixon, Two Constitutions Compared, 28 A.B.A. J. 733 (1942),
reprinted in SIR OWEN DIXON, JESTING PILATE 102 (Melbourne: Law Book,
1965), at 102 cited in H.P. Lee, The Implied Freedom of Political
Communication in H.P. LEE HP AND GEORGE WINTERTON (EDS), AUSTRALIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARKS 386 (Cambridge University Press 2003).

21. Australian Capital Television Propriety. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992)
177 C.L.R. 106, 136 (Austl.).
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professions.
Section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution authorises the
Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to "the
acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for
any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make
laws." This has been taken as imposing a just terms requirement
in respect of any compulsory acquisition by the Commonwealth of
property belonging to the state or to a person. There is complicated
case law that attaches to this provision. It extends to a very wide
range of property interests described by Sir Owen Dixon in the
Bank Nationalisation Case as "innominate and anomalous
interests . . . ."22 A law that extinguishes a property right may bear
the character of a law with respect to the acquisition of property. 23
In February last year, the Court held by a majority that the just
terms guarantee extended beyond the states into the territories
and, in particular, the Northern Territory of Australia. 24 In so
doing, it overturned the 1969 decision Teori Tau v.
Commonwealth.25 As a result, the just terms guarantee applied to
the acquisition of property rights conferred upon indigenous people
under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act. This
was a finding of some significance even though public reporting of
the decision focussed upon the Court's rejection of a challenge to
the validity of statutes supporting the Northern Territory
intervention. 26
Section 75(v) of the Constitution confers on the High Court
jurisdiction in any matter in which a writ of mandamus or
prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the
Commonwealth. Under that provision, the High Court can prevent
a public official, including a Minister of the Crown, from exceeding
his or her lawful power and may require a minister or official to
discharge a duty imposed upon him or her by law. The Court can
also quash a decision that is made in excess of power. Chief Justice
Gleeson described section 75(v) as providing in the Constitution "a
basic guarantee of the rule of law." 27 This section was inserted into
the Constitution at the suggestion of the delegate Andrew Inglis
Clark to avoid the deficiency in original jurisdiction identified by
Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.28 Because it is a
constitutional provision, the original jurisdiction it confers on the
22. Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1948) 76 C.L.R. 1, 349
(Austl.).
23. Georgiadis v. Australian and Overseas Telecomm. Corp. (1994) 179
C.L.R. 297.
24. Wurridjal v. Commonwealth (2009) 237 C.L.R. 309 (Austl.).
25. (1969) 119 C.L.R. 564 (Austl.).
26. Wurridjal v. Commonwealth (2009) 237 C.L.R. 309 (Austl.).
27. MURRAY GLEESON, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 67 (ABC
Books 2000).
28. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

2010]

ProtectingHuman Rights

777

Court cannot be removed by statute.
Section 80 of the Constitution provides:
The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the
Commonwealth shall be by jury, and every such trial shall be held
in the State where the offence was committed, and if the offence was
not committed within any State the trial shall be held at such place
or places as the Parliament prescribes.
The guarantee of trial by jury is contingent upon the offence
being tried by indictment. There have been a number of cases in
which the scope of this guarantee has been explored. Where it
applies, it has been held to require a unanimous verdict of the
jurors before a conviction can stand. 29 The Court recently heard a
case in which it was argued that, consistently with section 80,
there could be no appeal against a verdict of acquittal directed by
the trial judge. The Court has reserved judgment in that case.
Section 92 of the Constitution provides: "On the imposition of
uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse
among the States, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean
navigation, shall be absolutely free." There are two elements to
this guarantee: one is freedom of trade and commerce, the other is
freedom of intercourse. The latter freedom was relied upon to
strike down national security regulations in 1945 that were found
to prohibit interstate movement. 30 This aspect of section 92 has
been said to be related to the freedom of movement guaranteed in
article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).
Section 116 of the Constitution, which is another of the Clark
rights, provides: "The Commonwealth shall not make any law for
establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance,
or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious
test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public
trust under the Commonwealth." This guarantee does not apply to
the states but only to the Commonwealth. It has been litigated
from time to time. For instance, in Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel
Black v. Commonwealth,31 a challenge was brought to laws
providing for grants to the states to be distributed to religious
schools. The laws were said to establish a religion contrary to
section 116. The challenge was rejected. In 1997, the High Court
rejected an action brought by Aboriginal people claiming that
policies of the Northern Territory designed to place Aboriginal
children in foster care in church and state operated homes, had
interfered with their freedom to practice their own religion. The
majority held that the Aboriginal Protection Ordinance was not a
29. Cheatle v. R (1993) 177 C.L.R. 541 (Austl.).
30. Gratwick v. Johnson (1945) 70 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
31. (1981) 146 C.L.R. 559 (Austl.).
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law that could be characterised as a law "for prohibiting the free
exercise of any religion." 32
Section 117 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination
between residents of states. It provides: "A subject of the Queen,
resident in any State, shall not be subject in any other State to any
disability or discrimination which would not be equally applicable
to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other
State."
In an important decision in 1989, the Court struck down
Queensland laws that required any legal practitioner wishing to
practice in Queensland to have his or her principal practice there.
Although on the face of it the law, which was a rule made by the
Queensland Bar Association, applied to all legal practitioners, it
also operated to discriminate against out of state practitioners. 33
The specific guarantees to which I have referred may be seen
as falling within the categories of civil and legal process rights and
economic and equality rights. Australian constitutional law
academic Professor Peter Bailey has made a persuasive case for
their similarity to, if not identity with, a number of human rights
and freedoms guaranteed under the ICCPR, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).34
Chapter III of the Constitution provides for the federal
judicial power to be exercised by the High Court, by Federal courts
created by the Parliament, and also by state courts that are
invested with federal jurisdiction. The High Court has resisted
legislative or executive intrusions upon the judicial power. As one
of the judges of the High Court, Justice Gummow, said in a case
decided in 1998, "The legislative powers of the Commonwealth do
not extend to the making of a law which authorises or requires a
court exercising the judicial power to do so in a manner which is
inconsistent with its nature." 35 The Court has not gone so far as to
import a "due process" requirement from the text and structure of
Chapter 111.36 However, the constitutional scheme under which
state courts may be invested with federal jurisdiction brings them
within the protection of that chapter.
State parliaments cannot confer upon state courts' functions
which would so distort their institutional integrity as to make
them unfit repositories for federal jurisdiction. It has been said
that legislation that requires a court exercising federal jurisdiction
32. Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 C.L.R. 1, 40 (Austl.).
33. Street v. Queensland Bar Ass'n (1989) 168 C.L.R. 461 (Austl.).
34. See PETER H. BAILEY,
HUMAN
RIGHTS: AUSTRALIA IN AN
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT (Butterworths 1990); PETER H. BAILEY, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS ENTERPRISE IN AUSTRALIA AND INTERNATIONALLY (LexisNexis 2009).
35. Nicholas v. The Queen (1998) 193 C.L.R. 173, 232 (Austl.).
36. Thomas v. Mowbray (2007) 233 C.L.R. 307, 355 (Austl.).
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to depart to a significant degree from methods and standards that
have characterised judicial activities in the past may be repugnant
to Chapter III.3 In November 2009, the Court struck down a
provision of a civil assets forfeiture statute in New South Wales
that required the Supreme Court in that state to hear and
determine, on an ex parte basis, an application by the New South
Wales Crime Commission for an interim freezing order in relation
to assets suspected of being the proceeds of crime. Under the
legislation, an application to set aside the restraining order could
not succeed unless the applicant proved that it was more probable
than not that the interest in the property was not "illegally
acquired property." That in turn required the negating of a very
widely drawn range of possibilities of contravention of the criminal
law found in the common law and state and Federal statute law.
In the joint judgment of Justices Gummow and Bell, their Honours
characterised the process thus:
[97] The Supreme Court is conscripted for a process which requires
in substance the mandatory ex parte sequestration of property upon
suspicion of wrong doing, for an indeterminate period, with no
effective curial enforcement of the duty of full disclosure on ex parte
applications. In addition the possibility of release from that
sequestration is conditioned upon proof of a negative proposition of
considerable legal and factual complexity.
[98] Section 10 engages the Supreme Court in activity which is
repugnant in a fundamental degree to the judicial processes as
understood and conducted throughout Australia. 38
There are other provisions of the Constitution that, it may be
argued, have potential connections to human rights. These include
the electoral and franchise provisions and other provisions relating
to non-discrimination in taxing laws and in trade, commerce, or
revenue. It is sufficient to say that these linkages with the
relevant international human rights provisions are more difficult
to make.
In addition to the particular guarantees to which reference
has been made, the High Court has also held that there exists an
implied freedom of political communication.
V.

THE IMPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM OF POLITICAL
COMMUNICATION IN AUSTRALIA

In two decisions delivered on September 30, 1992, the High
of
Court recognised an implied constitutional freedom
communication on political matters in Australia. The first case,

37. Id. (referencing Justices Gummow and Crennan).
38. Int'l Fin. Trust Co. Ltd. v. New South Wales Crime Comm'n (2009) 240
C.L.R. 319, 366-67 (Austl.).
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involved a prosecution

of The Australian newspaper which had published an article
highly critical of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission.
The article said, inter alia, "The right to work has been taken
away from ordinary Australian workers. Their work is regulated
by a mass of official controls, imposed by a vast bureaucracy in the

Ministry of Labour and enforced by a corrupt and compliant
judiciary' in the official Soviet-style Arbitration Commission."40
The newspaper was prosecuted under section 299 of the Industrial
Relations Act, which provided that "[a] person shall not . . . (d) by
writing or speech use words calculated . . . (ii) to bring a member of

the [Industrial Relations] Commission or the Commission into
disrepute."41
The High Court held this section invalid. A majority of the
Court (Justices Brennan, Deane, Toohey, and Gaudron) held it
was invalid as infringing an implied freedom of political
discussion. The minority (Chief Justice Mason and Justices
Dawson and McHugh) held it invalid on the basis that it was not
within the scope of a relevant head of power in the Constitution.
Justices Deane and Toohey, in their joint judgment, based the
implication upon the system of representative government, for
which the Constitution provides:
The people of the Commonwealth would be unable responsibly to
discharge and exercise the powers of governmental control which
the Constitution reserves to them if each person was an island,
unable to communicate with any other person. The actual discharge
of the very function of voting in an election or referendum involves
communication. 42
They discerned in the doctrine of representative government
"an implication of freedom of communication of information and
opinions about matters relating to the government of the
Commonwealth." 43 The implication operated at the level of
communication and discussion between the people of the
Commonwealth and their members of Parliament and other
Commonwealth authorities. It also operated at the level of
communication between the people of the Commonwealth
themselves.
The other case in which judgment was delivered on

September 30, 1992, Australian Capital Television Propriety Ltd.
v. Commonwealth,44 involved a challenge to new Commonwealth
legislation proposing to impose a blanket prohibition on political
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

(1992) 177 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
Id. at 96 (emphasis in orginial).
Industrial Relations Act (1988) (Cth) (Austl.).
Nationwide News, (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 72.
Id. at 73.
(1992) 177 C.L.R. 106 (Austl.).
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advertisements on radio or television during Federal election
periods. The majority (Chief Justice Mason and Justices Deane,
Toohey, and Gaudron) held that the new provisions were invalid
because they infringed the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
political discussion. Chief Justice Mason acknowledged the
historical fact that the framers of the Constitution had not adopted
the United States model of a bill of rights. He accepted that it was
difficult, if not impossible, to imply general guarantees of
fundamental rights and freedoms in the Australian Constitution.
He went on to say,
the existence of that sentiment when the Constitution was adopted
and the influence which it had on the shaping of the Constitution
are no answer to the case which the plaintiffs now present. Their
case is that a guarantee of freedom of expression in relation to
public and political affairs must necessarily be implied from the
provision which the Constitution makes for a system of
representative government. The plaintiffs say that, because such a
freedom is an essential concomitant of representative government, it
is necessarily implied in the prescription of that system. 45
It is important to note that the implied freedom of political
communication did not confer enforceable rights on individuals.
Rather, it operated to limit the law-making power of the
Parliament to prevent it from encroaching upon that freedom.
The scope of the implied freedom has been considered in a
number of cases involving defamation actions brought by
politicians against media outlets. 46 As expounded in those cases,
the implied constitutional freedom of political communication does
not confer rights on individuals. Rather, it invalidates any
statutory rule which is inconsistent with that freedom. In the
context of defamation law, it also requires that the rules of the
common law conform to the Constitution. This affects, inter alia,
the scope of the defences of qualified privilege that might be raised
by media publishers. It does not extend to invalidate laws that are
reasonably appropriated and adapted to serve legitimate public
ends particularly relating to criminal conduct.
There is a question about the range of "political matters" that
fall within the implied freedom of communication. In Australian
Capital Television, they were referred to as "the wide range of
matters that may call for, or are relevant to, political action or
decision."47 In the Theophanous decision they were said, by Chief
Justice Mason and Justices Toohey and Gaudron, to extend to "all
45. Id. at 136.

46. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104
(Austl.); Stephens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 211
(Austl.); Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520 (Austl.);
Roberts v. Bass (2002) 212 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
47. Australian Capital,177 C.L.R. at 138.
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speech relevant to the development of public opinion on the whole
range of issues which an intelligent citizen should think about."48
The freedom does not extend, however, to matters
traditionally controlled by the criminal law. Justices Deane and
Toohey said in Nationwide News that
a law prohibiting conduct that has traditionally been seen as
criminal (eg conspiring to commit, or inciting or procuring the
commission of, a serious crime) will readily be seen not to infringe
an implication of freedom of political discussion notwithstanding
that its effect may be to prohibit a class of communications
regardless of whether they do or do not relate to political matters. 49
The most recent High Court decision to consider the implied
freedom of political communication was APLA Ltd. v. Legal
Services Comm'r (NSW).50 There it was held by a majority that the
implied freedom did not interfere with regulations restricting the
advertisement of legal services. The communication prohibited
was not political.
Some general observations may be made about the implied
freedom of political communication. For one, it is not limited to
citizens or individuals. Also, it offers no greater protection to the
press or the media than it does for individuals. As one
commentator observed, "The beneficiaries of the freedom are
consistently described as 'citizens' or 'electors' or 'the community',
without the media being accorded favourable, or indeed
unfavourable treatment by virtue of any claimed role as
watchdog."5 1 There is ongoing uncertainty about the scope of the
"political communication" protected by the freedom. 52
In areas relating to sedition, anti-terrorism, and antivilification laws, censorship and obscene publications questions
may be raised in future cases in regards to the interaction of
restrictions imposed by such laws with the implied freedom of
political communication. Their resolution may depend in part upon
the scope of the concept of "political communication" and which
restrictions are reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve
legitimate ends compatible with the system of government
provided by the Constitution.

48. Theophanous, 182 C.L.R. at 124, citing ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH 152 (Clarendon Press 1985).

49. Nationwide News, (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 77.
50. (2005) 224 C.L.R. 322 (Austl.).
51. MICHAEL R. CHESTERMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIAN LAw: A
DELICATE PLANT 44 (Dartmouth 2000).

52. Adrienne Stone, The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure:
Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication, 23 MELB.
U. L. REV. 668 (1999); Adrienne Stone, The Limits of Constitutional Text and
Structure Revisited, 28 U.N.S.W.L.J. 842 (2005).
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VI. AUSTRALIAN DEBATES ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Debate about the desirability of both constitutional and
statutory bills of rights has been going on in Australia for many
years. Attempts to introduce statutory bills of rights as
Commonwealth law were made in 1973 and 1985. The 1973 Bill
was strongly opposed and was not enacted. It lapsed in 1974 when
Parliament was prorogued. The 1985 Bill was passed by the House
of Representatives, but did not secure a majority in the Senate.
In 1985, the Attorney-General Lionel Bowen established a
Constitutional Commission. That Commission recommended the
inclusion in the Constitution of a new Chapter VIA guaranteeing
specified rights and freedoms against legislative, executive or
judicial action. A proposed new section 124E specified a number of
these rights.
A constitutional alteration referendum was conducted in
September 1988 and it did not involve the full suite of rights
proposed by the Commission. Rather, it would have extended
existing rights relating to religious freedom, compensation for the
acquisition of property, and trial by jury. It also proposed a one
vote, one value, principle. However, it was overwhelmingly
defeated. The reasons for its defeat had to do with an associated
proposal for four-year parliamentary terms and a perception that
somehow the changes were going to enhance the powers of the
Commonwealth Parliament to the disadvantage of the states. No
further attempt has been made to incorporate guaranteed rights
and freedoms into the Australian Constitution.
There have been initiatives at state and territory level in
Australia to provide statutory protection for human rights. In
2004, the Australian Capital Territory enacted the Human Rights
Act ("Act"). The Act was broadly modeled on similar legislation in
the United Kingdom, and it declares a number of rights. All of the
rights declared are said to be "subject only to reasonable limits set
by Territory laws that can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society."
The Australian Capital Territory legislation cannot affect the
validity of any subsequent, inconsistent laws of the territory, nor
can it affect Commonwealth laws that apply in the territory.
When a law of the territory is held by the Supreme Court of the
territory to be inconsistent with a human right protected by the
Act, the Court may make a declaration of incompatibility. 54 Such a
declaration does not affect the validity, operation, or enforcement
of the law or the right or obligations of anyone. When such a
declaration is made, the Attorney-General must put a copy of it to
53. Human Rights Act, 2004, § 28 (Austl.).
54. Human Rights Act § 32.

784

The John Marshall Law Review

[43:769

the Legislative Assembly of the territory within six sitting days
after the Attorney-General receives the copy. The AttorneyGeneral must also prepare a written response to the Declaration of
Incompatibility and present it to the Legislative Assembly not
later than six months after the day the copy of the declaration was
presented.
In 2006, the State of Victoria enacted a Charter of Human
Rights and Responsibilities. The Charter is similar in its impact
on legislation to the Act. The rights that it protects apply only to
"persons."5 5
The topic of constitutional and statutory protection of human
rights in Australia has frequently been a matter of controversy. A
prominent element of the arguments advanced against the
introduction of such rights protection in Australia is that it shifts
power on important matters of social policy from elected
politicians to unelected judges. There is no doubt that human
rights and freedoms guaranteed in constitutions and statutes
around the world are broadly expressed. The definition of their
limits in particular cases by reference to public interest
considerations necessarily requires normative judgments which
may be seen to have a legislative character.
The phenomenon of judges interpreting broad, legal language
and making normative decisions in that interpretation is not new.
Such concepts as "reasonableness," "good faith," and
"unconscionable conduct" found in the common law and in many
statutes involve that kind of decision-making. The particular
sensitivity of judgments about the scope of human rights
guarantees is their impact on legislation. If a right is
constitutionally guaranteed, then legislation held by a court to be
incompatible may be invalid. If a statute guarantees the human
right, then a subsequent inconsistent statute will not thereby be
invalid. However, the declaration of incompatibility mechanism for
which the Australian Capital Territory and Victorian legislation
provides, is intended to impact the parliamentary process by
requiring the Attorney-General to present the declaration to the
Parliament and provide a response.
Significant controversy or lack of bipartisan political support
will generally defeat any attempt to change the Constitution in
Australia. For the foreseeable future there are unlikely to be any
express provisions introduced into the Australian Constitution
that protect or guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms of the
kind set out in the ICCPR or the economic and social rights set out
in the ICESCR.
Australia is a party to the ICCPR and the ICESCR and many
55. Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act, 2006, § 6 (Austl.
Vic).
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other treaties and conventions which are designed to protect and
advance fundamental human rights and freedoms. The
Commonwealth Parliament, by virtue of its power to make laws
with respect to "[e]xternal [a]ffairs," 5 6 has legislated to give
domestic legal effect to certain human rights treaties, but not the
ICCPR or the ICESCR. Laws giving effect to such conventions,
which are laws passed by the Commonwealth, would override
inconsistent state laws and thus could be seen as providing a
quasi-constitutional guarantee of human rights and freedoms
against state laws impinging on them. However, at the
Commonwealth level human rights statutes would not affect the
validity of a subsequent inconsistent Commonwealth law. Human
rights statutes in Australia giving effect to international
conventions include anti-discrimination laws in relation to race,
sex, disability, and age.57 The Migration Act provides for the issue
of protection visas for persons who fall within the definition of
"refugee" in the Refugees Convention of 1954. The Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Commission is a federal body, set up by
statute to deal with complaints of infringements of the various
anti-discrimination Acts and to promote and educate in relation to
human rights. It also has an intervention role in judicial
proceedings. Mention should also be made of the Privacy Act that
has recently been the subject of a comprehensive review by the
Australian Law Reform Commission, which has recommended,
inter alia, the creation of the statutory equivalent of a Privacy
Tort.
Consideration of the Constitution and statutes made under it
does not cover the whole field of discourse relevant to protection of
rights and freedoms in Australia. The common law of Australia,
inherited from England and developed by our own courts, has a
constitutional dimension and an impact on the protection of those
freedoms. It is useful to consider aspects of that common law
heritage.
VII.

THE COMMON LAW - A CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY

The phrase "common law" refers to a body of principles or
rules of law worked out on a case-by-case basis by courts in
England and latterly in this country. The judicial law-making
process is incremental and it has been described as being like "the
sluggish movement of the glacier rather than the catastrophic
charge of the avalanche."5 8
56. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution § 51(xxix).
57. Racial Discrimination Act, 1975 (Cth) (Austl.); Sex Discrimination Act,

1984 (Cth) (Austl.); Disability Discrimination Act,1992 (Cth) (Austl.); Age
Discrimination Act, 2004 (Cth) (Austl.).
58. SIR P.H. WINFIELD ET AL., WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 17 (Sweet

& Maxwell, 14th ed. 1994).
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The common law has a constitutional dimension because,
amongst other things, as Sir John Latham wrote in 1960, "in the
interpretation of the Constitution, as of all statutes, common law
rules are applied."59 That constitutional dimension is also reflected
in the institutional arrangements the common law brings with it.
At its core are public courts that adjudicate between parties and
are the authorised interpreters of the law that they administer.60
As Professor Goodhart said, the most striking feature of the
common law is its public law, it being "primarily a method of
administering justice."61
In a lecture delivered last year, Chief Justice Spigelman of
the Supreme Court of New South Wales recounted the role of
"natural rights" in Blackstone's formulation of the common law.
Bentham attacked the idea of such rights as "nonsense on stilts."62
Blackstone's language of natural rights does not have the same
force today, but the role of the common law as a repository of
rights and freedoms is of considerable significance. A recent, nonexhaustive list of what might be called rights said to exist at
common law, include: the right of access to the courts, immunity
from deprivation of property without compensation, legal
professional privilege, privilege against self-incrimination,
immunity from the extension of the scope of a penal statute by a
court, freedom from extension of governmental immunity by a
court, immunity from interference with vested property rights,
immunity from interference with equality of religion, and the right
to access legal counsel when accused of a serious crime. 63 To that
list might be added: no deprivation of liberty, except by law, the
right to procedural fairness when affected by the exercise of public
power, and freedom of speech and of movement. These rights are,
of course, of a limited nature and are contingent in the sense that,
subject to the Constitution, they can be modified or extinguished
by Parliament.
It is also important to recognise, as Professor Bailey pointed
out in his recent book on human rights in Australia, that common
law "rights" have varied meanings. In their application to
interpersonal relationships, expressed in the law of tort, contract,
or in respect of property rights, they are justiciable and may be
said to have "a binding effect." But "rights" to movement, assembly
59. John Latham, Australia, 76 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 54, 57 (1960).
60.

SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE EXPANSION OF THE COMMON LAW 51

(London Stevens 1904).
61. A.L. Goodhart, What is the Common Law, 76 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW
45, 46 (1960).
62. James Spigelman, Chief Justice of New South Wales, First Lecture in
the 2008 McPherson Lectures at the University of Queensland, Brisbane: The
Common Law Bill of Rights (Mar. 10, 2008).
63. Jennifer Corrin, Australia: Country Report on Human Rights, 40
V.U.W.L.R. 37, 41-42 (2009).
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or religion, for example, are more in the nature of "freedoms."
They cannot be enforced, save to the extent that their
infringement may constitute an actionable wrong such as an
interference with property rights or a tort. 64
The common law method, in contrast with that involved in
the implementation of a bill of rights, is a case-by-case approach
that develops the relevant principles incrementally. In 1983,
Professor Daryl Lumb wrote of judges in a common law system
without a constitutional Bill of Rights. He said,
The creativity of the judges is . . . restricted by the ground rules of
the system which does not have its source in a fundamental
constitutional document which is subject to final review by a
constitutional court.
As a corollary of this, the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty enables the rules to be changed and even
abrogated. Judicial decisions even of the most basic nature
(whatever may be the conventions which restrict the legislative
power) are subject to being superseded by legislation which,
although open to interpretation, is not open to invalidation by a
constitutional court.65
He went on to suggest that rights and freedoms at common
law might be regarded as "residual in nature." In my opinion,
however, the word "residual" is too weak, having regard to the way
in which the courts have approached the interpretation of statutes
by reference to those rights and freedoms.
VIII.

COMMON LAW RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

The common law has been referred to in the High Court as
"the ultimate constitutional foundation in Australia."6 6 It has a
constitutional
and
statutory
influence
upon
pervasive
interpretation. As Justice McHugh said in Theophanous, "The true
meaning of a legal text almost always depends on a background of
concepts, principles, practices, facts, rights and duties which the
authors of the text took for granted or understood, without
conscious advertence, by reason of their common language or
culture." 67
The exercise of legislative power in Australia takes place in
the constitutional setting of a "liberal democracy founded on the
principles and traditions of the common law."68 The importance of
64. PETER H. BAILEY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS ENTERPRISE IN AUSTRALIA AND
INTERNATIONALLY (LexisNexis 2009).
65. RICHARD DARRELL LUMB, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 103

(Butterworths 1983).
66. Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996) 187 C.L.R. 1, 182 (Austl.).
67. (1994) 182 C.L.R. at 196.
68. R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Pierson, (1998) A.C.
539, 587 (Austl.).
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the principles and traditions of the common law in Australia is
reflected in the long-established proposition that statutory law is
to be interpreted consistently with the common law where the
words of the statute permit. In a passage still frequently quoted in
the 1908 decision, Potter v. Minahan,6 9 Justice O'Connor said,
referring to the fourth edition of Maxwell on The Interpretationof

Statutes,70

It is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would
overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from
the general system of law, without expressing its intention with
irresistible clearness; and to give any such effect to general words,
simply because they have that meaning in their widest, or usual, or
natural sense, would be to give them a meaning in which they were
not really used (footnote omitted).
That statement was based upon a passage in the judgment of
Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Fisher.71
The principle enunciated in Potter v. Minahan has evolved
into an approach to interpretation that is protective of
fundamental rights and freedoms. It has the form of a strong
presumption that broadly expressed official discretions are to be
subject to rights and freedoms recognised by the common law. It
has been explained in the House of Lords as requiring that
Parliament "squarely confront what it is doing and accept the
political cost."72 Parliament cannot override fundamental rights by
general or ambiguous words. The underlying rationale is the risk
that, absent clear words, the full implications of a proposed statute
law may pass unnoticed. "In the absence of express language or
necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore
presume that even the most general words were intended to be
subject to the basic rights of the individual."73
Although Commonwealth statutes in Australia are made
under a written constitution, the Constitution does not in terms
guarantee common law rights and freedoms against legislative
incursion. Nevertheless, the interpretive rule can be regarded as
"constitutional" in character even if the rights and freedoms that it
protects are not. There have been many applications of the general

69. (1908) 7 C.L.R. 277, 304 (Austl.).
70. PETER BENSON MAXWELL, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 122
(Sweet and Maxwell, 4th ed. 1905).
71. 6 U.S. 358, 390 (1805).
72. R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Simms, (2000) 2 A.C.
115, 131 (Austl.). See also R. v. Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham, (1998) Q.B.
575 (Austl.); and David Dyzenhaus et al., The Principle of Legality in
Administrative Law: Internationalisationas Constitutionalisation,1 OXFORD
U. COMMONW. L. J. 5 (2001).
73. R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Simms, (2000) 2 A.C. at
131 (U.K.).
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rule which, in Australia, had its origin in Potter v. Minahan. It
has been expressed in quite emphatic terms. Common law rights
and freedoms are not to be invaded except by "plain words"7 4 or
necessary implication. 75
The presumption, however, has not been limited to only those
rights and freedoms historically recognised by the common law.
Native title was not recognised by the common law of Australia
until 1992. It is nevertheless the beneficiary of the general
presumption against interference with property rights for native
title is not considered extinguished by legislation unless the
legislation reveals a plain and clear intent to have that effect. This
presumption applies to legislation that may have predated the
decision in Mabo (No 2) by many decades and in some cases by
more than 100 years. As said in the Mabo decision, it is a
requirement that flows from "the seriousness of the consequences
to indigenous inhabitants of extinguishing their traditional rights
and interests in land."76
Two high profile cases involving the application of the
presumption in the Federal Court in the last few years were full
court judgments: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v.
Haneef7 and Evans v. New South Wales.7 8 In Haneef, the Full
Court construed section 501 of the Migration Act narrowly. That
section defined the circumstances in which a person would not
pass the "character test" and so be liable for refusal or cancellation
of a visa on character grounds. A person would fail the character
test if "the person has or has had an association with someone else
or with a group or organisation whom the Minister reasonably
suspects has been or is involved in criminal conduct."79 The Court
had to interpret the kind of "association" which would bring a
person within the criterion. Was it good enough to be a relative or
a friend of a person involved in criminal conduct? The Court said,
[Having regard to its ordinary meaning, the context in which it
appears and the legislative purpose, we conclude that the
association to which [the section] refers is an association involving
some sympathy with, or support for, or involvement in, the criminal
conduct of the person, group or organisation. The association must
80
be such as to have some bearing upon the person's character.
In Evans, the Court was concerned with the validity of a

regulation made under the World Youth Day Act. Under the
74. In re Cuno (1890) L.R. 43 Ch. D. 12, 17 (U.K.).
75. Melbourne Corp. v. Barry (1922) 31 C.L.R. 174, 206 (Austl.).
76. Mabo v. Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 64 (Austl.).
77. (2007) 163 F.C.R. 414 (Austl.).
78. (2008) 168 F.C.R. 576 (Austl.).
79. Migration Act, 1958, § 501(6)(b) (Cth) (Austl.),; cited in Haneef, (2007)
163 F.C.R. at 422.
80. Haneef, (2007) 163 F.C.R. at 447 (emphasis in original).
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regulation, a person could be directed not to engage in conduct
causing annoyance to participants in a World Youth Day event.
The Full Court referred to cases about the presumption and to
what Chief Justice Gleeson said in Electrolux Home Products
ProprietyLtd v. Australian Workers' Union.81 He stated,
The presumption is not merely a common sense guide to what a
Parliament in a liberal democracy is likely to have intended; it is a
working hypothesis, the existence of which is known both to
Parliament and the courts, upon which statutory language will be
interpreted. The hypothesis is an aspect of the rule of law. 82
In the Evans case, the regulation making power conferred by
the Act, was interpreted according to the common law principle
and found not to authorise a broadly stated regulation directed to
conduct causing "annoyance to participants in World Youth Day
events." 83 It was interpreted, inter alia, in such a way as to
minimise interference with freedom of speech.
In the quotation from Professor Lumb's text on Australian
constitutionalism mentioned earlier, the suggestion was made that
common law rights and freedoms could be regarded as "residual."
Indeed, the common law has always adhered to the proposition
that "everybody is free to do anything, subject only to the
provisions of the law."8 4 This may suggest that freedom is what is
left over when the law is exhausted. However, the interpretive
principle in Australia and its equivalent in England, suggest that
it is more than that. Trevor R.S. Allan put it thus:
The traditional civil and political liberties, like liberty of the person
and freedom of speech, have independent and intrinsic weight: their
importance justifies an interpretation of both common law and
statute which serves to protect them from unwise and ill-considered
interference or restriction. The common law, then, has its own set of
constitutional rights, even if these are not formally entrenched
against legislative repeal.85
By way of example, there has long been a particular
recognition at common law that freedom of speech and the press
serves the public interest. Blackstone said that freedom of the
press is "essential to the nature of a free State."86 In 1891, Lord
Coleridge characterised the right of free speech as "one which it is
81. (2004) 221 C.L.R. 309.
82. Id. at 329.
83. Evans, 168 F.C.R. at 598.
84. Att'y Gen. v. Observer Ltd. (No 2) (1990) 1 A.C. 109, 283(Eng.); Lange,
(1997) 189 C.L.R. at 564.
85. Trevor R.S. Allan, The Common Law as Constitution: Fundamental
Rights and First Principles in COURTS OF FINAL JURISDICTION: THE MASON
COURT IN AUSTRALIA 148 (Cheryl Saunders ed., Federation Press 1996).
86.

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

151-52 (Clarendon Press 1769).
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for the public interest that individuals should possess, and, indeed,
that they should exercise without impediment, so long as no
87
wrongful act is done."
Despite its limits and vulnerability to statutory change, the
common law gives a high value to freedom of expression,
88
Courts
particularly the freedom to criticise public bodies.
on an
to
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The application of the principle in support of freedom of
expression was seen at the level of constitutional characterisation
of powers in the decision of the High Court in Davis v.
Commonwealth.8 9 Nineteen eighty-eight was the bicentenary of
European settlement of Australia and a company was established
called the Australian Bicentennial Authority to plan and
implement celebrations of the bicentenary.The Australian
Bicentennial Authority Act was enacted to, inter alia, reserve to
the Authority the right to use or licence the use of words such as
"bicentenary," "bicentennial," "200 years," "Australia," "Sydney,"
"Melbourne," "Founding," "First Settlement," and others in
conjunction with the figures 1788, 1988, or 88. Articles or goods
bearing any of these combinations without the consent of the
Authority would be forfeited to the Commonwealth. In their joint
judgment striking down some aspects of these protections, Chief
Justice Mason, and Justices Deane and Gaudron (Justices Wilson,
Dawson, and Toohey agreeing) said,
Here the framework of regulation . . . reaches far beyond the
legitimate objects sought to be achieved and impinges on freedom of
expression by enabling the Authority to regulate the use of common
expressions and by making unauthorized use a criminal offence.
Although the statutory regime may be related to a constitutionally
legitimate end, the provisions in question reach too far. This
extraordinary intrusion into freedom of expression is not reasonably
and appropriately adapted to achieve the ends that lie within the
90
limits of constitutional power.
The common law can, of course, only go so far. It does not
provide the support for freedom of expression that would accord it
the status of a "right." It cannot withstand plainly inconsistent
statute law.
The common law interpretive principle protective of rights
87. Bonnard v. Perryman (1891) 2 Ch. 269, 284 (U.K.); see also R v. Comm'r
of Police of the Metropolis, ex parte Blackburn (No 2) (1968) 2 Q.B. 150, 155
(Austl.); Wheeler v. Leicester City Council (1985) A.C. 1054 (Austl.); Observer
Ltd., 1 A.C. at 220 (Austl.).
88. Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed. 1989) Vol 8(2) para. 107.
89. (1988) 166 C.L.R. 79 (Austl.).

90. Id. at 100; see id. at 116 (referencing Justice Brennan).
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and freedoms against statutory incursion retains its vitality,
although it has evolved from its origins in a rather antidemocratic, judicial antagonism to change wrought by statute. It
has a significant role to play in the protection of rights and
freedoms in contemporary society, while operating in a way that is
entirely consistent with the principle of parliamentary supremacy.
Whether it goes far enough, or whether we need a Human Rights
Act to enhance that protection with judicial and/or administrative
consideration of statutory consistency with human rights and
freedoms, is a matter for ongoing debate.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The role of constitutions and constitutional law can be of
great significance in the protection of fundamental human rights
and freedoms. So too can statutory provisions and the common
law. Ultimately, however, these things will only have the
importance that people who are served by the Constitution and the
laws and those who exercise power under the Constitution and the
laws attach to those freedoms. It is useful to finish with two
cautionary observations. One was made by a great American judge
and the other by the drafters of the Indian Constitution.
In a short but celebrated speech entitled "The Spirit of
Liberty" delivered in 1944, Judge Learned Hand of the United
States said,
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no
constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no
court, can even do much to help it. While it lies there it needs no
constitution, no law, no court to save it.91

I do not adopt this statement in its full generality, but it
underlines the importance of a culture of respect for human rights
and freedoms within society. The debate is to what extent such a
culture may be supported, nurtured and protected by law.
The other remark which I think is worth quoting, was made
by Dr. B.K. Ambedkar who was Chairman of the Drafting
Committee of the Constituent Assembly that drafted the Indian
Constitution. On November 25, 1949, the day before that
Constitution was accepted, he said,
I feel however good a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad
because those who are called to work it, happen to be a bad lot.
However bad a Constitution may be, it may turn out 92to be good if
those who are called to work it, happen to be a good lot.

91. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty (May 21, 1944). See LEARNED
HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND

190 (Irving Dillard ed., Knopf 1952).

92. Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Address given on the occasion of the 50th
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Both of these observations, like most observations in these
areas, should be treated as provisional, perhaps working
hypotheses, but worthy of continuing consideration. They may
help place our existing debate in a larger perspective.

anniversary of the Republic of India (Jan. 27, 2000) citing Dr. B.K. Ambedkar
participating in the Constituent Assembly Debates, available at http://
parliamentofindia.nic.in/jpil MARCH 2000/CHAP1.htm.

